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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jace Stoney Thompson appeals from the district court's orders revoking
his probation and ordering execution of his sentences.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In May 2007, in Case No. CR-07-03909, the state charged Thompson with
burglary and felony eluding after he broke into a private residence and then led
police on a high speed chase when they attempted to detain him. (#39515 R.,
pp.15-18, 24-25, 38-39, 41-42.) Once police were able to stop Thompson, they
discovered a handgun and a bag of coins in his car, which Thompson admitted
stealing from another residence. (#39515 R., pp.17-18.) Thompson pied guilty
to both the burglary and eluding charges and the court imposed a unified fiveyear sentence with two years fixed and retained jurisdiction. (#39515 R., pp.43,
48-50.) Following the retained jurisdiction review period, the court suspended
Thompson's sentence and placed him on probation. (#39515 R., pp.61-65.)
Seven months later, on September 23, 2008, the state filed a Report of
Probation Violation alleging Thompson violated his probation by absconding 'from
supervision.

(#39515 R., pp.67-68.)

The state subsequently withdrew the

violation upon learning Thompson was incarcerated in Washington. (#39515 R.,
p.69.)
On May 21, 2010, Thompson's probation officer asked the court to
discharge Thompson from supervision noting Thompson had paid all applicable
fees, had "not had any significant violations of his probation," and had "completed
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New Directions Aftercare."

(#39515 R., p.77;

also pp.78-79.)

The court

granted the request and placed Thompson on unsupervised probation. (#39515
R., pp.78-79.)

Six months later, in November 2010, in Case No. CR-2010-09611, the
state charged Thompson with burglary after he broke into an elementary school
where he was discovered with a camera that belonged to one of the teachers.
(#39504 R., pp.10-17, 54.) Thompson's new criminal charge in Case No. CR2010-09611 also served as the basis for a probation violation allegation in Case
No. CR-2007-3909, which violation Thompson ultimately admitted. (#39515 R.,
pp.81-82, 101.)

The state also filed a Report of Unsupervised Probation

Violation on December 20, 2010, alleging an additional violation - that Thompson
consumed alcohol. (#39515 R., pp.103-104.) Thompson admitted this violation
as well after which the court revoked his probation, ordered his sentence
executed, and retained jurisdiction. (#39515 R., pp.117, 123-125.)
Thompson later pied guilty to the burglary charge in Case No. CR-201009611 and the court imposed a unified six-year sentence with three years fixed
and ordered the sentence to run concurrent with Thompson's sentence in Case
No. CR-2007-3909, and retained jurisdiction as it did in Case No. CR-2007-3909.
(#39504 R., pp.63, 71-73.) At the conclusion of the retained jurisdiction review
period, the court suspended Thompson's sentences in both cases and placed
him on probation. (#39515 R., pp.133-136; #39504 R., pp.84-89.)
Less than two months after the court placed Thompson on probation, the
state filed a Report of Probation Violation alleging Thompson violated his
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probation by consuming alcohol and committing new crimes.

(#39515 R.,

pp.138-139; #39504 R., pp.90-91.) Following an evidentiary hearing, the court
found Thompson violated his probation as alleged by the state.
p.159; #39504 R., p.111.)

(#39515 R.,

On November 17, 2011, the court revoked

Thompson's probation in both cases and ordered his sentences executed.
(#39515 R., pp.163-165; #39504 R., pp.115-117.)
notice of appeal in both cases.

Thompson filed a timely

(#39515 R., pp.172-174; #39504 R., pp.124-

126.)
Thompson filed a motion to consolidate his cases on appeal, which the
Idaho Supreme Court granted.

(Motion to Consolidate Nos. 39504 & 39515,

Order Granting Motion to Consolidate dated April 5, 2012.)
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ISSUES
Thompson states the issues on appeal as:
1. Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Thompson due
process and equal protection when it denied his Motions to
Augment the record with various transcripts from the prior
proceedings of his cases, and which contained information
relevant to his appeal.
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by revoking Mr.
Thompson's probation or, alternatively, by not reducing it sua
sponte pursuant to Rule 35.

(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Has Thompson failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated
his constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate record
with five irrelevant transcripts?
2.
Has Thompson failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by
either revoking probation or failing to reduce his sentence upon doing so?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Thompson Has Failed To Establish The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His
Constitutional Rights By Denying His Motions To Augment The Appellate Record
With Irrelevant Transcripts

A

Introduction
After the appellate record was settled, Thompson filed motions to augment

with seven unprepared transcripts. (Docket No. 39515, Motion To Augment And
To Suspend The Briefing Schedule and Statement In Support Thereof, filed
March 26, 2012 ("Motion I"); Docket No. 39504, Motion To Augment And To
Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof, filed March
26, 2012 (hereinafter "Motion II").) The requested transcripts included (1) the
July 26, 2007 change of plea hearing and the September 20, 2007 sentencing
hearing in Case No. CR-2007-3909 (Motion I); (2) the December 15, 2010
change of plea hearing and the February 9, 2011 sentencing hearing in Case No.
CR-2010-09611 (Motion II, p.1 ); (3) .the July 6, 2011 retained jurisdiction review
hearing (Motion II, p.1); and (4) the November 2, 2011 1 admit/deny hearing and
the November 16, 2011 probation violation disposition hearing (Motion II, pp.1-2).
The state filed an objection to Thompson's motion requesting augmentation with
the two transcripts from 2007 and an objection to Thompson's request for the
transcripts from proceedings held on December 15, 2010, February 9, 2011, and
1

Thompson's motion incorrectly referenced the date of this hearing as November
3, 2011 (Motion II, p.2), which erroneous reference was repeated in the state's
objection and the Court's order, however, as noted in Thompson's later motion
renewing his request to augment the record, the actual date of the hearing was
November 2, 2011; therefore, all references in this brief will reflect the actual date
of the hearing.
5

July 6, 2011.

(Docket No. 39515 Objection To "Motion To Augment And To

Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof," filed March
28, 2012; Docket No. 39504, Objection In Part To "Motion To Augment And To
Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof," filed March
28, 2012.) The state did not object to Thompson's request for the November 2,
2011, and November 16, 2011 transcripts.
The Idaho Supreme Court granted Thompson's request to augment the
record with transcripts from the hearings held on November 2 and 16, 2011, but
denied Thompson's request for the remaining transcripts. (Order, dated April 12,
2012.) Two months later, Thompson filed a Renewed Motion To Augment And
Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof ("Renewed
Motion"). In his Renewed Motion, Thompson noted he obtained a CD-ROM that
contains "all but one of the transcripts initially requested" and argued the
"requested items" are "necessary for an adequate record on appeal because they
all contain specific information relevant to Mr. Thompson's claims on appeal,
notably potentially-mitigating evidence and statements by the defendant,
himself."2 (Renewed Motion, p.3.) The state objected to Thompson's Renewed
Motion, and the Idaho Supreme Court adhered to its original decision denying
Thompson's motion to augment the record with additional transcripts. (Objection
To "Renewed Motion To Augment And Suspend the Briefing Schedule And
Statement In Support Thereof," 'filed June 26, 2012; Order Denying Renewed
2

Although the CD does not include one of the transcripts Thompson has
requested, he nevertheless renewed his request for augmentation with that
transcript, asserting "it is reasonable to presume that this transcript would also
contain relevant information as well." (Renewed Motion, p.3 n.3.)
6

Motion To Augment And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule," dated July 10,
2012.)
Thompson now contends that, by denying his motions to augment the
appellate record with the requested transcripts, the Idaho Supreme Court has
violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and has
denied him effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's Brief, pp.716.)

Thompson has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights

because he has failed to show that the requested transcripts are even relevant
to, much less necessary for resolution of, the only issues over which this Court
has jurisdiction on appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

C.

Should This Case Be Assigned To The Idaho Court of Appeals,
Thompson Has Failed To Provide Any Basis For The Court To Reconsider
The Idaho Supreme Court's Orders Denying His Motions To Augment
In State v. Morgan, 2012 WL 2782599 (Idaho App. July 10, 2012), the

Idaho Court of Appeals considered a claim that the Idaho Supreme Court denied
the appellant his constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the
record on appeal with various transcripts. In doing so the Court "disclaim[ed] any
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authority to review, and, in effect, reverse an Idaho Supreme Court decision
made on a motion made prior to assignment of the case to [the Idaho Court of
Appeals] on the ground that the Supreme Court decision was contrary to the
state or federal constitutions or other law." Morgan at* 2. Such an undertaking,
the Court explained, "would be tantamount to the Court of Appeals entertaining
an 'appeal' from an Idaho Supreme Court decision and is plainly beyond the
purview of this Court."

lit

The Court, however, "deem[ed] it within [its] authority .

. . to evaluate and rule on [a] renewed motion" if, for example, "the completed
appellant's brief and/or respondent's briefs have refined, clarified or expanded
issues on appeal in such a way as to demonstrate the need for additional records
or transcripts, or where new evidence is presented to support a renewed motion."

1ft To the extent this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, Thompson's
arguments fail to provide any basis for the Court to reconsider the Idaho
Supreme Court's orders denying his motions to augment the record with
additional transcripts that are unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal.
Thompson claims otherwise, arguing that, even if this case is assigned to
the Court of Appeals, he would not be asking the Court of Appeals to "review or
overrule the decision of the Idaho Supreme Court made in regard to the decision
to augment the record." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) "Rather," Thompson claims, "he
is asserting that certain, now-final, decisions made during the appellate review
process deprived him of certain constitutional rights during his appeal."
(Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Exactly how Thompson thinks this assertion negates the
Court of Appeals' statement in Morgan regarding the limitation on its ability to

8

review a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court is unclear. As noted in Morgan,
the Court of Appeals' authority only allows it to "evaluate and rule on [a] renewed
motion" if, for example, "the completed appellant's brief and/or respondent's
briefs have refined, clarified or expanded issues on appeal in such a way as to
demonstrate the need for additional records or transcripts, or where new
evidence is presented to support a renewed motion." Morgan at *2. The Court of
Appeals cannot exercise such authority in this case because the Idaho Supreme
Court has already ruled on Thompson's Renewed Motion and Thompson has not
"refined, clarified or expanded [the] issues on appeal in such a way as to
demonstrate the need for additional records or transcripts," nor has he presented
new evidence to support renewing his motion to augment yet again.

Instead,

assuming the case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, he is asking the Court to
re-evaluate the relevancy argument that was already presented to and rejected
by the Idaho Supreme Court. As stated in Morgan, the Court of Appeals has no
authority to do so.

D.

If This Court Considers The Merits Of Thompson's Constitutional Claims,
He Has Failed To Establish Any Of His Rights Have Been Violated
To the extent this Court considers the merits of Thompson's constitutional

claims, all of his arguments fail.

As in Morgan, Thompson argues that he is

entitled to the additional transcripts because, he claims, the failure to provide
them is a violation of his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection,
and the effective assistance of appellate counsel. (Appellant's Brief, pp .10-16.)
All of Thompson's arguments lack merit.
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"A defendant in a criminal case only has a due process right to a record
on appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged
regarding the proceedings below." Morgan at *2 (citing cases, internal quotations
omitted.) Thompson's appeals are timely only from the district court's November
17, 2011 orders revoking probation and ordering his sentences executed. The
transcripts of the proceedings related to that revocation decision are included in
the record on appeal and are more than adequate to evaluate the district court's
decision to revoke probation. (See generally 11/2/2011 Tr. (evidentiary hearing),
11/16/2011 Tr. (disposition hearing}.} Further, the information cited by the district
court in reaching its decision is also contained in the record.
11/16/2011 Tr., p.84, L.6 - p.85, L.14, p.105, L.12

(Compare

p.109, L.22 (reciting

Thompson's history on probation and the reasons the court finally revoked
probation without retaining jurisdiction} with #39515 R. and #39504 R. (includes
probation violation pleadings and minutes}.)

The record also contains the

presentence report prepared in Thompson's 2007 case and the 2011 APSI. (See
Exhibits.)
Thompson nevertheless contends this information is inadequate for
appellate review because, he argues, the additional transcripts are "relevant for
the simple reason that a diligent district judge would review the file, as well as
any potentially-relevant audio hearings [sicJ, if he could not remember what he
had heard at those prior hearings, in order to sufficiently consider the evidence
before ruling on the sentencing issues."

(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.)

That

Thompson has identified excerpts from transcripts of prior proceedings, which
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are not included in the appellate record, and that he believes provide mitigating
information about him (Appellant's Brief, p.8), does not mean the transcripts are
necessary for adequate review of the district court's revocation decision.

If

Thompson thought that information was critical to the court's revocation decision,
he should have presented it to the court at the November 16, 2011 disposition
hearing. Indeed, contrary to appellate counsel's implication otherwise, the record
reveals that much of the information identified in the Renewed Motion that he
deems so critical to a disposition decision is already included in the appellate
record.

(Compare PSI, pp.9-10 (regarding Thompson's difficult childhood) with

Renewed Motion, pp.11-12, i19.a. (same); compare #39515 R., pp.123-125 and
#39504 R., pp.71-73 (second period of retained jurisdiction ordered in February
2011) with Renewed Motion, p.12,

i'li'l

9.c.-d. (discussion of appropriateness of

ordering second period of retained jurisdiction in February 2011 ); compare Letter
from Jace Stoney Thompson dated November 2, 2011 (Exhibit) and 11/6/2011
Tr., p.100, L.22 - p.105, L.11 (Thompson's statements at disposition regarding
difficulty with addiction and desire to be available to care for his daughter) with
Renewed Motion, pp.12-13,

i'li'l 9.e.-g.

(highlighting Thompson's prior statements

regarding alcohol addiction and desire to be available to care for his daughter)).
Further, Thompson's suggestion that the district court was required to sua
sponte listen to "potentially-relevant audio hearings [sic]" and ascertain whether

Thompson previously presented some mitigating evidence before deciding
whether to revoke probation or reduce Thompson's sentences upon revocation is
not only contrary to logic and reality, it is unsupported by law. Cf. Idaho State
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Bar v. Clark, 153 Idaho 349, _ , 283 P.3d 96, 103 (2012) ("this Court will not
search the record on appeal for unspecified error"); United States v. Dunkel, 927
F.2d 955, 956 (?1h Cir. 1991) ("Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried
in briefs."). State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 218 P.3d 5 (Ct. App. 2009), upon
which Thompson relies, does not hold otherwise. (Appellant's Brief, p.9.)
In Hanington, the Court of Appeals stated that, in reviewing a sentence
that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, the Court "will
examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original
judgment" and review is based "upon the facts existing when the sentence was
imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the
revocation of probation." 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7. This language from
Hanington does not require augmentation with transcripts of all hearings from
sentencing to the final revocation.

As explained in Morgan, such an

interpretation of Hanington is too broad. Morgan at *3. The Court clarified that
although it "will not arbitrarily confine [itself] to only those facts which arise after
sentencing to the time of the revocation of probation ... that does not mean that
al/ proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane."
(emphasis original).

~

Rather, "[tJhe focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying

the trial court's decision to revoke probation."

~

Accordingly, the Court "will

consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the
revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on
appeal."

~

Because all relevant information is already included in the record
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on appeal, Thompson has failed to show any due process violation resulting from
the Supreme Court's orders denying his requests for augmentation.
Thompson's equal protection argument also lacks merit.

The Court in

Morgan rejected the argument that equal protection mandates augmentation of
all transcripts the appellant desires, stating:
Morgan was not denied the transcripts because of indigency.
Morgan was afforded the opportunity to designate not only the
standard clerk's record, but also additional records necessary for
inclusion in the clerk's record on appeal. He had time to review the
record and make any objections, corrections, additions, or deletions
prior to settling of the record, pursuant to I.AR. 29(a). Morgan's
failure to fully and timely utilize the Idaho Appellate Rules, and his
failure to demonstrate the need for the transcripts in his motion to
augment the record, precluded him from including the first
probation violation hearing transcripts, not his indigency. Morgan's
motion to augment failed to make a showing that any appellant,
indigent or otherwise, would be entitled to the record as requested.
Morgan at *4. Thompson's equal protection claim fails for the same reasons.
Finally, the Court in Morgan also rejected the assertion that the denial of a
motion to augment the record on appeal results in the deprivation of the effective
assistance of counsel.

Morgan at *4.

Thompson, like Morgan, "has failed to

demonstrate how effective assistance of counsel is not possible without the
requested transcripts."

&

All of Thompson's claims relating to the denial of his motions to augment
the record fail.
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11.
Thompson Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its
Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Thompson argues that the district court abused its discretion in revoking

probation "in light of his successes on probation and in the rider programs, as
well as his acceptance into Freedom Place."

(Appellant's Brief, p.16.)

Thompson also argues that, for these same reasons, the district court abused its
discretion by not reducing his sentences upon revocation.

(Appellant's Brief,

pp.18-19.) Both of these arguments fail to establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v.
Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378,381,870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)).

C.

Thompson Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Revoking His Probation
A district court's decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on

appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion. State v. Lafferty,
125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994).

An abuse of

discretion cannot be found if the district court's decision was consistent with
applicable legal standards, and was reached by an exercise of reason.

!f:l

"The purpose of probation is rehabilitation." State v. Wilson, 127 Idaho
506, 510, 9Q3 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct. App. 1995). "In deciding whether revocation of
probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether
14

the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued
probation is consistent with protection of society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525,
529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

Any cause satisfactory to the court,

which indicates that probation is not meeting its goals, is sufficient to justify
revocation. Wilson, 127 Idaho at 510, 903 P.2d at 99. Contrary to Thompson's
assertions on appeal, a review of the record shows the district court did not
abuse its discretion in revoking Thompson's probation.
In deciding to revoke Thompson's probation, the district court reasoned:
I have had you on probation twice. On the first sentence you
eventually violate that sentence by commission of this second
burglary and it's a real -- it was a real burglary. We are talking
about a nighttime entry into a school, so very serious offense
violating a probation that you are already on for a previous burglary
charge. And neither of these offenses are -- alcohol is not a part of
either of these offenses but it's certainly a contributing factor that as
a driver I think behind these offenses. And I think for a long time
you should have been in a position to know that for you and a lot of
other people consuming alcohol leads to some of these other poor
decisions and ultimately offenses for which you create victims
within the community and demonstrates obviously very bad
judgment on your part because it's the first step where the
judgment comes in and that's the decision to consume alcohol.
Here these latest probation violations maybe if it was just
alcohol, that would be one thing and I might be facing a little
different situation, but it was more than that. You were observed at
a local business trying to force entry into the business, ultimately
found in a vehicle at that business. And nobody can really know
what your intention was in that. I know that you have explained that
you were needing someplace to sleep and maybe that's plausible,
maybe it's not. But what we know is you were there, someplace
you shouldn't have been, you had been consuming alcohol, and
again there was a potential for another victim to be created within
the community.
When I put somebody on probation, Mr. Thompson, I'm
telling the community that I trust that person to be on probation, and
I trust that person to be within the community and he's not going to
15

bring any further harm to that community. Here, as I have said, I
have you on probation a couple of times and you have violated that
and abused that trust that I have put in you, and I have to have
some credibility in the community that I live in too for probationers.
(11/6/2011 Tr., p.105, L.15-p.1O7, L.8.)
As illustrated by the district court's comments, Thompson's probation was
clearly not achieving the goal of rehabilitation nor was it at all consistent with the
protection of society.

The court's findings in this regard were more than

adequate to justify revocation. That Thompson may have been successful on
probation at one point does not compel a contrary conclusion nor do Thompson's
successes in the retained jurisdiction program.

If anything, that Thompson

performed well during the retained jurisdiction program demonstrates that
incarceration is precisely what is appropriate to address Thompson's compliance
issues.
As for Thompson's claim that revocation was not appropriate given his
acceptance into the Freedom Place program, which he claims was better
designed to address his addiction issues than any of the previous programming
he received (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-21 ), the district court specifically addressed
this request:
I'm familiar with Freedom Place and I'm familiar with some of
the individuals that both work there and are living there, and I'm -- I
think it's a fine program, I'm glad we have it, and I think it is doing
well in these early stages and I hope it continues. Unfortunately for
me at this point in time, Mr. Thompson, I just feel that this option for
you has come too late and you needed to pay attention to the
opportunities that you had previously, and I'm not going to be able
to incorporate this as part of my disposition today.
(11/6/2011 Tr., p.108, Ls.11-21.)

16

That the district court did not accept Thompson's proposed alternative to
incarceration does not, as Thompson claims, mean the district court did not
adequately consider that option or that it "insufficiently" considered Thompson's
rehabilitative potential,

particularly given the

requirement that continued

probation be consistent with the protection of society. The record establishes the
district court acted well within its discretion in revoking Thompson's probation.

D.

Thompson Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion
By Not Sua Sponte Reducing His Sentences Upon Revocation
Thompson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it failed to

reduce his sentence upon revoking probation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.22-23.) In
support of this argument, Thompson relies on the same rationale he offered in
claiming the district abused its discretion in revoking his probation. (Appellant's
Brief, p.23.) Because Thompson failed to establish error in the revocation of his
probation, he has likewise failed to show the district court should have sua
sponte reduced either of his sentences.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
orders revoking Thompson's probation and executing his sentences without
reduction.
DATED this 5th day of November, 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of November, 2012, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

18

